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The telecommunication infrastructure is it comprised of two main networks, the landline and broadband
data service network, and the wireless cellular service network. These are linked together by means of
data interoperability and transmission exchanges, made in turn of different components
including among others, underground cables, access pits, roadside cabinets, overhead lines and poles,
cellular towers, exchange facilities.
Their operational robustness becomes even
more critical in a post-disaster scenario when
these services are used in civil protection and
emergency plans, as well as for the
restoration of all the other critical
infrastructure. Despite the relevance of loss of
functionality of telecommunication networks
on seismic resilience, studies on their
performance assessment are few in the
literature.
New Zealand, one of the most natural
disaster-prone countries in the world, is
regularly subject to high-intensity
earthquakes, and its co-seismic events such
liquefaction and landslides, inflicting loss of
lives and costly damage to the country’s
infrastructure (Figure 1 and Figure 2).
2. Aims & Objectives
The main aim of the current project is to develop a comprehensive and systematic risk assessment
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1. Introduction
3. The New Zealand Telecommunication System
Given that these networks cover a large
geographical area, they can be easily
subjected to the effects of a seismic event,
either the ground shaking itself, or co-seismic
events such as liquefaction and landslides.
6. Outcomes Expected & Future Steps4. Data Collected
Figure 4 – Schematic structure of the telecommunication network in New Zealand 
( Courtesy of Chorus)
Figure 5 – GIS Layout of Fibre Cables, Road Cabinets and Exchanges in Christchurch inspected 
after the CE (Adapted from NZGD). 
5. Hazard Representation
As part of the project:
 Data and information related to the 
physical damage and functional 
impacts suffered by the various 
components of the 
Telecommunication System during 
the Christchurch 2010-2011 
earthquake sequence (CES) are 
processed.
 A methodology is developed for the 
collection of information and the 
subsequent assessment of the 
networks’ performance. 
 Information gaps are critically 
identified regarding physical and 
functional failures of the various 
components, the timeline of repair 
and reconstruction activities and 
service recovery.
 Practical improvements in the post-
disaster collection from both a 
network and organisational 
viewpoints are proposed to increase 
the resilience of the system.
Figure 3 – New Zealand Seismic Zonation Scheme. These zones are modified versions of those in Figure 
5.4 of NZS 3604:2011 to better align with NZS 1170.5:2004, Structural design actions- Earthquake 
actions – New Zealand and recent rezoning of the Canterbury region. (BRANZ, n.d.) 
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The performance of the telecommunication
networks is of high priority as it has a
substantial impact on our lifestyle during
business-as-usual times.
Figure 2 – Liquefaction inside ducts in a manhole observed during the inspections after 
the CES (Courtesy of Chorus).
Locally, the New Zealand telecommunications
infrastructure is mainly based of
interconnected fibre-optic network, while the
copper networks are still in place but are
increasingly being replaced.










GIS location; Site inspection from the CES
GIS layout of Fibre network with number of cables
GIS location
Manholes and Ducts investigation observation 
from CES (Size, Damage description, Cost)
Building type structure and damage, repair time 
and cost 
Cable type, fault type, fault location, cost and 
reparation time
Design Information, Temperature, Cables, 
Repair Cost and Time, damage type
GIS location, Quantitative Damage Assessment 
and Fault Distance, Material, Repair Time 
GIS Location, Design & Damage Information, 
Repair Cost and Time 
GIS Location, Design & Damage Information, 
Repair Cost and Time
GIS Location, Design & Damage Information, 
Repair Cost and Time
GIS Location, Design & Damage Information, 
Repair Cost and Time
Figure 6 – GIS Layout of Fibre Cables, Road Cabinets and Exchanges in Christchurch inspected after 
the Canterbury Earthquake.
Table 1– Type of data acquired for the telecommunication components and supplementary information to further resolve the impact on the network system.
Even though the effect of the CES’ lessons from the performance of the 2010/11 system have already
been implemented in the new telecommunication network, which will be more resilient to future hazards,
the present project aims to provide a further step for increasing the system resilience. In particular, it will:
- Detailing the geotechnical assessment to understand the influence of liquefaction on the infrastructure
network;
- Proposing fragility models for different components of the telecommunication networks;;
- Investigating the inter-dependencies with other infrastructure systems.
The obtained results from the project will allow providers to quickly identify the most vulnerable
components among the surveyed stock, guide more detailed data collection and assessment procedures,
and ultimately plan further retrofitting measures or if necessary replacement.
6. Data processing
Telecommunication Data were acquired for the main components of the telecommunication network of
Christchurch City, namely: Exchange buildings, Roadside cabinets, Fibre Cable, access pits including
vaults and manholes. Table 1 provides an overview of the data made available by Chorus for each of
these components and investigated after the CES.
In order to have a better understanding of the telecommunication network system, telecommunication
data collected in the aftermath of the event including all the missing components, such as aerial cables
and piles, SCADA Equipment and copper cables, have been requested to different providers and are in the
process to be analysed.
The most damaging earthquake of
the CES was the Mw= 6.2 which
stroke the city of Christchurch on
the 22 February 2011 (Tang et al.,
2014). Thus, this event is the one
that has been taken into
consideration in the analyses.
The city and its telecommunication
infrastructure network was strongly
impacted by an unprecedented
level of liquefaction. This was
mainly observed through the
southern and eastern suburbs of
Christchurch alongside the main
river that flows through the city.
Figure 5, adapted from the one
provided by the New Zealand
Geotechnical Database, shows the
property liquefaction severity, based
on visual observations from roads.
Figure 1 – Damage to a roadside cabinet in Christchurch (Courtesy of Chorus).
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Data collected are processed in a Geographic Information System (GIS) environment, given that the
software facilitates cross-referencing operations between different information. If the locations are
known, it is possible to attribute to each component of the telecommunication system a seismic
intensity measure (PGA, Sa, PGD) and liquefaction level. Thus, it is possible to correlate the observed
damage to the corresponding seismic impact.
As illustrated in Table 1 and Figure
6, this operation has been
performed for the Exchanges,
Roadside cabinets and Buried
cables for which the geographic
coordinates are known.
The introduction of a quantitative
damage description is desirable.
The assignment of damage level
required some interpretation,
given that in the available data, if
this information was provided, it
was a general qualitative
description.
It will be worth further
investigation in design detail of
each component to distinguish
any particular trends. For instance,
useful information would be
dimensioned, age of construction,
material, constructive details,
seismic design level, and also time
and cost required to repair.
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